Volume 7
Issue 1 Winter 1977
Winter 1977

Age Discrimination in Employment: A Comparison of the Federal
and State Laws and Remedies in New Mexico
Joseph F. Canepa
Larry M. Reecer

Recommended Citation
Joseph F. Canepa & Larry M. Reecer, Age Discrimination in Employment: A Comparison of the Federal and
State Laws and Remedies in New Mexico, 7 N.M. L. Rev. 51 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol7/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: '
A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS AND REMEDIES IN NEW MEXICO
JOSEPH F. CANEPA* and LARRY M. REECER**

Age discrimination in employment has been prohibited by federal
law since 1967 under the "Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967." ' In 1969 the New Mexico Legislature made such age
discrimination an "unlawful discriminatory practice" under the
"New Mexico Human Rights Act."' While the federal and state acts
provide extensive coverage as well as a broad panoply of remedies,
they also present a maze of procedural requirements and pitfalls to
aggrieved employee in his attempts to seek redress under the acts.
Several recent federal court decisions interpreting the procedural
requirements of the federal act in the context of applicable state laws
and remedies have further complicated this procedural morass. This
article provides a comparative overview of the federal and state acts
and an explanation of their substantive and procedural relationship.
THE FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

A. Substantive Provisions
The federal "Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967"1
(hereafter the ADEA) outlaws discrimination in employment because
of age in almost every form. 4 Under Section 623 of the ADEA,
employment agencies and labor organizations are
employers,'
*Assistant Attorney General for the State of New Mexico; J.D. Notre Dame Law School;
Member, New Mexico Bar.
**Managing Attorney, Senior Citizens Law Office of the Legal Aid Society of Albuquerque, Inc.; J.D. Georgetown University Law School; Member, New Mexico Bar.
1. 29 U.S.C. § § 621-634 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 4-33-1 to -12 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1975).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
4. Id. § 623. Section 621(b) states that the Congressional purpose of the ADEA is "to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." Although the basic
thrust of the ADEA is to prohibit certain employment practices which discriminate against
the older worker the ADEA also requires the Secretary of Labor under Section 622(a) to
"undertake studies and provide information to labor unions, management and the general
public concerning the needs and abilities of older workers and their potentials for continued
employment and contribution to the economy."
5. Id. § 630(b) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970), includes, under
the term "employer," states, political subdivisions of a state or their agencies, interstate
agencies but not the United States. Section 633a(a) prohibits age discrimination in federal
government employment.
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prohibited from discriminating against older employees on the basis
of age in hiring, discharge, compensation, terms and conditions of
employment, classification or referral for employment and advertisements for employment indicating or implying a preference based
on age. 6 The federal ADEA, however, only protects those individuals
"who are at least 40 years of age but less than 65 years of age." '
Furthermore, it only applies to industries affecting commerce who
have 20 or more employees, to employment agencies, labor unions
and by recent amendment to states, political subdivisions and
agencies thereof and to the federal government.8
The ADEA creates two important exceptions where discrimination is permitted. Section 623(f)(1) provides that it is not unlawful
for an employer, employment agency or labor organization to take
any action otherwise prohibited:
...where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age. 9
Thus, if the employer can demonstrate that the very nature of the
job requires a young worker (e.g., actors required for youthful roles
or for promotion of products designed to appeal exclusively to the
young) or that the requirements for the job necessarily exclude older
workers (e.g., occupations which are particularly hazardous and
require rapid reflexes, endurance or strength such as an underwater
demolition man or iron worker) the discrimination does not violate
the ADEA. 1'
Although the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception
was interpreted by the Secretary of Labor as having limited scope
and application with the burden of proof clearly on the shoulders of
the discriminator seeking to rely upon it,' 1 the courts have mitigated
the burden of proof where the nature of the job poses some risk of
bodily harm to the public. In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,' 2
the Secretary of Labor challenged the Greyhound Bus Line's policy
6. Id. § 623 (1970). Section 623(d) of the ADEA also protects the employee from any
retaliatory measures taken by an employer because of the employee's opposition to unlawful practices or his participation in investigation, proceedings, or litigation under the
ADEA.
7. Id. § 631 (Supp. V, 1975),formerly 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970).
8. Id. § 623 (1970) and § § 630, 633a(a) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § § 630,
633 (1970).
9. Id. § 623(0(1) (1970).
10. 29 CFR § 860.102(e), § 860.103(f)(1)(ii) (1975).
11. Id. § 860.102(b).
12. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'g 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. 111.1973).
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of hiring persons for driving inter-city buses who were under 35 years
of age. In reversing the lower court's decision against Greyhound
which had found an absence of a scientific factual basis for Greyhound's employment policy, the court of appeals concluded that:
Greyhound need only demonstrate however a minimal increase in
risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of the hiring
policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might
1
otherwise occur under the present hiring practice. 3

The second major exception of "differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age" has found judicial interpretation in
Stringfellow v. Monsanto," where an employer was forced to reduce
his work force for economic reasons and the evidence showed that
the average age of the employees had been lowered by a reduction of
the work force. The court held that the employer had not violated
the ADEA because the reduction in employees had been accomplished under a comprehensive evaluation criteria in which age was
an entirely neutral factor. Additionally, it is also not unlawful under
the ADEA to "discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for
good cause."' 5 In Brennan v. Reynolds & Company,'6 an elderly
receptionist alleged that she had been unlawfully fired because of her
advanced age. The defendant-employer contended that the plaintiff
was fired for "good cause" and in support introduced time sheets
and affidavits proving habitual tardiness. In granting the employer's
motion for summary judgment the court interpreted the congressional intent of Section 621 of the ADEA and the "good cause"
defense provided for in Section 623(f)(3) in the following manner:
Section 621 does not cast upon the court the duty of determining
that a discharge was, for reasons other than age, a justifiable discharge. It serves only to prevent discharge because of age alone.
However, even when age is but one of a number of causes for discharge, the finding must be that the discharge was not "for good
cause," within the meaning of 621 ... On the other hand, where
the discharge is that of a person whose "age" by tradition and
custom was excessive; where it actually was not the employer's
13. 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974);seealso Usery v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) where policy of refusing initial employment of intercity bus
drivers over 40 was upheld, and McIlvanie v. Pennsylvania State Police, 6 Pa. Cmwlth. 505,
296 A.2d 630 (1972) where mandatory retirement of state policemen at age 60 was held
not to violate the ADEA because of bona fide occupational qualifications.
14. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970); see also Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1970).
16. 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. II. 1973).
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consideration, discharge for other reasons would under the statute
be a "good cause" discharge.

In litigating claims under the ADEA the employee-plaintiff has the
burden of going forward with the evidence and has the ultimate
1
burden of proof in establishing discrimination under the ADEA. 8
However, once the employee has made a prima facie showing of age
discrimination the burden of justification then shifts to the defendant-employer. 1 9 As in cases brought under Title VII of the "Civil
Rights Act," courts have held that a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA can be made by proof of a pattern and practice
2
from which age discrimination can be inferred. " Without evidence
of such a pattern and practice of age discrimination in employment
policies the employee faces a more difficult time in sustaining his
burden of proof. 2
Certain provisions of the ADEA have also been interpreted by the
Secretary of Labor to authorize involuntary retirement irrespective
of age so long as the "retirement" is pursuant to the terms of a bona
fide "retirement or pension plan" meeting the requirements of
Section 623(f)(2). 2 2 Although such mandatory retirement laws and
policies are permitted under the ADEA, they have been challenged
2
on constitutional grounds in the area of public employment. 3
17. Id. at 444.
18. Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1975); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973);
deLoraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1974).
19. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974); Schulz v. Hickok
Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
20. Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. See Surrisi v. Conwed.Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(t)(2) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1975). Section 623(0(2) of the
ADEA provides: "[I t shall not be unlawful for an employer ... to observe the terms of a
bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter,
except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual."
For a critical discussion of whether the Secretary's interpretation is supported by the
legislative history of the ADEA see Gilan, The Federal Age Discriminationin Employment
Act Revisited, 9 Clearinghouse Rev. 766, 767 (March 1976).
23. The constitutional attacks have been in the area of public employment where the
employer has been sufficiently clothed in state action to be subject to the 5th and 14th
amendment constraints. These challenges have centered on the deprivation of the
employee's due process and equal protection rights. All have thus far proved unsuccessful.
In Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974),rev'd per
U.S. - (1976),44 U.S.L.W. 5077 (June 27, 1976), the U.S. Supreme Court
curiam,
held constitutional Massachusett's mandatory retirement law for uniformed state police
officers at age 50, utilizing the "relatively relaxed" rational basis standard after finding that
government employment was not a "fundamental right" and that state officers over age 50
were not a "suspect class" requiring "strict scrutiny." See Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp.
933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975) involving mandatory retirement for
federal employees at age 70 where such policy was argued to impose an irrebutable
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Finally, in the area of advertising for employment where both the
language of the ADEA and the interpretive regulations of the Secretary of Labor clearly forbid "any indication of preference, specification or discrimination based on age,''2

'

enforcement of the

provisions has been greeted with judicial resistance. In Brennan v.
Paragon Employment Agency, Inc.,2
the Secretary of Labor
brought suit against an employment agency which advertised for
"college students," "girls," "boys," and "June graduates" and in
spite of the fact that the Secretary's own interpretive regulations had
designated these precise terms as discriminating against older persons
in advertising for employment, 2 6 the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss, refusing to accept the Secretary's interpretation
and the clear mandate of Section 623(e). The court reasoned that:
The purpose of the Act was to prevent persons aged 40 to 65 from
having their careers cut off by unreasonable prejudice. It was not
intended to prevent their children and grand-children from ever
getting started. There is nothing in the Act that authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to prohibit employers from encouraging young
persons-whether
or not in college-to turn from idleness to useful
2
endeavors. 7

The holding in Paragon is somewhat symptomatic of the general
reluctance the courts have demonstrated in giving force and effect to
the substantive provisions of the ADEA.
B. ProceduralRequirements
The administration and enforcement of the ADEA have been
delegated to the Department of Labor except where federal government employees are involved. 2" The Civil Service Commission has
the responsibility of enforcement of the ADEA where age discrimination arises in federal employment. 2 9 Both agencies are authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations interpreting the provisions of the
ADEA.3 0 Timely and proper notice of alleged discriminatory pracpresumption of non-productivity and thus depriving the employee of due process; see also
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U.S. 918 (1975); Mcllvanie v. Pennsylvania State Police, 454 Pa. 129,
309 A.2d 801 (1973), dismissing appeal, 415 U.S. 986 (1974); Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp.
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd., 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129
(1973).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(b) (1975).
25. 356 F. Supp., 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd mem., 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 288.
27. Id. at 288, 289.
28. 29 U.S.C. § § 622, 624, 625 and 626 (1970).
29. Id. § 633a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
30. Id. § 628 (1970) and § 633a(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
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tices must be given by aggrieved individuals to these federal agencies.
Recent court pronouncements have made scrupulous adherence to
these requirements essential. The ADEA requires that aggrieved
individuals must give written notice to the Department of Labor of
the alleged discrimination and their intent to file a lawsuit within
180 days of the discriminatory act.3 1 However, if a state agency has
become involved, the Department of Labor may be so notified
within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice or within 30 days
after receipt of notice of termination proceedings under state law,

whichever occurs first. 3 2 The existence of a state agency, empowered under a state law to grant or seek relief from such age
33
discrimination, further complicates the procedural requirements.
Section 633 of the ADEA provides that no suit either by an individual or the Secretary of Labor may be filed "before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under State law,
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." ' 34 If such a

state agency exists the aggrieved individual must notify the state
agency by a written and signed statement, by registered mail, of the
discriminatory practice within the appropriate time limit set by state
law (90 days under the "New Mexico Human Rights Act"). 3 The
aggrieved party must also wait 60 days after notifying the Secretary
of Labor before commencing his own law suit. 3 6 Finally, all law
suits brought under the ADEA must be filed within 2 years after the
cause of action occurs or within 3 years if the action is willful. 3 ' The
31. Id. § 626(d)(1) (1970). Written notice should be addressed to the local Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
32. Id. § 626(d)(2).
33. Id. § 633(b).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 633(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-9A (1953). Although such notice to state
authorities is nowhere made a prerequisite to federal litigation under the ADEA, three
federal courts (discussed infra) have made it a condition precedent to subject matter jurisdiction. See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v. H. K.
Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 359 F. Supp. 525
(D.N.J. 1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich., 1974); but see Skoglund v. Singer
Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975), Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1976); Bertsch v. Ford Motor Co., 415 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970). Where federal employees are involved the individual
must wait 30 days after giving the Civil Service Commission notice of intent to file before
commencing his own civil action. Notice of age discrimination and intent to file a civil
action must be filed with the Civil Service Commission within 180 days of the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful practice. Id. § 633a(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). While non-federal employees
may file "in any court of competent jurisdiction" for relief under the ADEA, id. § 626(c)
(1970), federal employees must file in the federal district court. Id. § 633a(c) (Supp. IV,
1974).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1970) incorporating § 255(a) (1970).
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courts have construed all of these notice and time requirements to be
jurisdictional prerequisites. 3 8
The required notice to the Secretary of Labor need not conform
to any rigid specifications. However, the court in Burgett v. Cudahy
Company,3 9 interpreting an opinion letter of the Department of
Labor, required that it must contain the basic facts which would
enable the Secretary to perform his functions.
It should be provided in writing in a letter properly addressed to the
Secretary; it should contain an identification of the parties involved;
and it should include a general description of the alleged discriminatory action.4 °

The purpose of requiring an individual to notify the Secretary of
Labor of a violation before he can file a law suit in court is clearly to
encourage private settlements and voluntary compliance through the
direct involvement of the Department of Labor with its investigative
and conciliatory powers. 4 ' The courts have rigidly construed this
180 day notice requirement as a mandatory, jurisdictional condition
precedent to private litigation, and have literally required that the
notice specifically express the individual's intent to file his own law
suit. In Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,4 2 the
court of appeals affirmed a lower court decision dismissing a private
individual's suit for lack of jurisdiction where the Department of
Labor was only notified of "a desire that an agency of the federal
government commence litigation "1 3 on the claimant's behalf and
not that the claimant intended to file an independent action. The
claimant in Powell twice notified the Secretary in writing within the
180 day time limit. However, because neither the first notification,
which set out the alleged violation, nor the second, which requested
that the Secretary file a law suit on her behalf, specifically mentioned the claimant's intention to file her own suit, the court found
the notice to be fatally defective.
In a subsequent case the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals again considered the same notice requirement in the context of whether
failure of the employer to post required notices of the ADEA waived
or tolled the 180 day time limit. The employer in Edwards v. Kaiser
38. Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Burgett v.
Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504
(D.D.C. 1973); Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971);
Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975).
39. 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
40. Id. at 621.
41. Id.
42. 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. Id. at 489.
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had failed to comply with

Section 627 and 29 C.F.R. § 850.10 which require the posting of
notices of the applicability of the ADEA in conspicuous places. 4"
The plaintiff, a former employee, had filed suit for damages alleging
wrongful discharge because of age under the ADEA. The plaintiff did
not give the Secretary of Labor notice of his intent to sue until more
than a year and a half had elapsed from the wrongful discharge and
more than 180 days after he gained actual knowledge of the ADEA
through consultation with his attorneys. The district court granted
the employer's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed.
Both courts rejected the employee's argument that the employer's
failure to post notices totally relieved the employee of his obligation
to give the Secretary notice of his intent to file suit within 180 days.
While the district court held that the 180 day notice requirement is
tolled by the employer's failure to post notices until such time as the
employee gains actual knowledge, the court of appeals refused to
consider the issue as the employee had also failed to comply within
180 days of securing counsel and obtaining actual knowledge. The
court did state by way of dicta that "[T] olling rather than waiver
would also supply a remedy commensurate with the wrong. '"6

Again, as in Powell, the failure of the employee to give timely notice
to the Secretary was deemed to be a failure to meet a jurisdictional
prerequisite for maintaining an action under the ADEA.4 The equit48
able doctrine of tolling was adopted in Skoglund v. Singer Co.,
where the employer's failure to post the required ADEA notices
under Section 627 allegedly prevented the employee from notifying
the Department of Labor of the ADEA claim within the prescribed
time limit. The court found that the 180 day notification requirement of Section 626(d) was analagous to a statute of limitation and
thus subject to equitable modifications. Concluding that the employer's failure to post the appropriate ADEA notices would serve to
toll the Section 627 notice requirement the court reasoned:
44. 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970) provides that "[E]very employer ...shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by the
Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this Chapter." 29 C.F.R. § 850.10 (1975) provides that "[Elvery employer ... which has an obligation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises the notice pertaining to the applicability of the Act prescribed by the Secretary of Labor or his authorized
representative. Such a notice must be posted in prominent and accessible places where it can
readily be observed by employees .. " However, the ADEA is silent on specific penalties
for violations of this section.
46. 515 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. Id.
48. 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
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..ADEA is remedial legislation. It is therefore, entitled to a broad

reading. It creates rights in a class of employees, the elderly

employed, and it places a burden on employers to inform that class

of their rights. If that burden is not met, this remedial legislation will
benefit few. Congress has specifically placed this burden upon

employers, and, although it did not provide for a tolling of the one

hundred eighty day notification requirement, to toll the requirement
would not be inconsistent with the general remedial and humanitarian purposes of ADEA. 4 9

Upon receipt of the notice of intent to sue the ADEA directs that
"the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named therein as
prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to
eliminate any alleged unlawful -practice by informal methods of
conciliation, conference, and persuasion." ' 0 The ADEA charges the
Secretary with the responsibility of affirmatively seeking voluntary
compliance through conciliation with the employer before any
judicial action can be taken by the Department of Labor.' 1 The
efforts of the designated compliance officer in reaching such voluntary compliance must be substantial, given the recent court holding
in Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corporation. 2 The compliance officer
in that case engaged in two conferences with the employer, as well as
a telephone conversation, all of which proved fruitless. In spite of a
finding that the employer had indeed violated the ADEA, the lower
court dismissed the Secretary's suit because such attempts at conciliation were inadequate. In affirming the lower court's decision the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the compliance
officer need not rigidly follow "positions announced in handbooks," 5 the efforts at conciliation must be "exhaustive, affirmative action." ' ' Section 626(b) specifically bars only suits brought by
the Secretary and the adequacy of the conciliation efforts of the
Secretary should not affect the commencement of a private, civil
action under Section 626(c).
49. Id. at 804. See also Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), where
similar reasoning adopted allowing commencement of action after statutory period had run.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
51. Id. § 626(b) provides: "[Blefore instituting any action under this section, the Secretary shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect
voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of
conciliation, conference, and persuasion."
52. 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb. 1973),aff'd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
53. 495 F.2d 368, 376 (8th Cir. 1974). The lower court had implied in its decision that
the compliance officer's departure from a field operation handbook setting out procedures
for seeking voluntary compliance would make the conciliation efforts inadequate per se.
362 F. Supp. 1156, 1159-1160 (D. Neb. 1973).
54. 495 F.2d at 374 (8th Cir. 1974).
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Class actions brought under the ADEA are governed by Section
216(b) of the "Fair Labor Standards Act"' I and not by Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 6 For an employee to become
a member of the class he must file a written consent to be made a
party to the suit with the court in which the action is brought. All
members of the class action need not individually comply with the
jurisdictional notice requirements 5to the Secretary if the representative plaintiff has properly done so. 7
Finally, the ADEA grants to the courts broad remedial powers
including judicially imposed employment, reinstatement, promotion,
and awards of back wages or unpaid overtime compensation in cases
brought either by the Secretary or an individual employee.5 8
THE NEW MEXICO HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
A. Substantive Provisions
The State of New Mexico outlaws age discrimination in certain
employment practices under the "New Mexico Human Rights Act"
(hereafter the NMHRA).5 I This act also creates a seven member
"Human Rights Commission" to administer and enforce the statutory prohibitions against discrimination. 6" The NMHRA prohibits a
broad spectrum of discriminatory practices based on race, religion,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical or mental handicap as well
as age.
Section 4-33-7A of the NMHRA makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for "an employer, unless based on a bona fide
occupational qualification, to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote
or demote or to discriminate in matters of compensation against any
person otherwise qualified because of race, age, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, or physical or mental handicap."
Although the NMHRA goes on to prohibit discriminatory practices
in such other employment related areas as union membership,
training programs, job advertisement, employment agencies and in
the areas of housing and credit on the basis of race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, and physical or mental handicap, 6 1
55. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970), incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
56. LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
57. Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 624 (D. Kan. 1973).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). Liquidated damages may only be awarded for willful
violations of the ADEA at the discretion of the court. Chilton v. National Cash Register
Company, 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974). The plaintiff may also recover attorney's
fees and costs. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
59. Supra at note 2.
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 4-33-3 (Supp. 1975).
61. Id. § 4-33-7 B, C, D, E, F, G, and H.
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''age" as a prohibited basis of discrimination is not further included.
The NMHRA is thus more limited in its coverage of employment
discrimination than the ADEA which not only prohibits discriminatory practices based on age in the hiring, firing, promotion and
compensation of employees as covered by the state act, but also
prohibits discriminatory practices in the terms and conditions of
employment, classification or referral for employment, and advertisements for employment indicating a preference based on age.
Furthermore, the ADEA extends its coverage beyond employers to
also include labor organizations and employment agencies. On the
other hand, the NMHRA applies to employers with 4 or more employees6 2 which is significantly broader than the federal ADEA
which covers only employers with 20 or more employees whose
businesses affect interstate commerce. Another feature of the
NMHRA which may extend its umbrella of coverage beyond that of
the federal act is the fact that the term "age" is not defined to
include or exclude numerical age groups. Whereas the ADEA offers
protection only to persons between 40 and 65 years of age, the
NMHRA protects all age groups where age is used as a basis for
discrimination.*
The NMHRA allows two exceptions to its age discrimination
prohibition. Discrimination is allowed where it is based on a "bona
fide occupational qualification, '"63 and, by recent amendment,
mandatory retirement of an employee at 65 is permitted if the
employer has a retirement plan in accordance with the "Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974," 26 U.S.C. § 410 etseq.
(Supp. 1976).6" The language defining the two exceptions parrots

the federal ADEA and would suggest similar judicial interpretations
by the New Mexico courts. In Keller v. City of Albuquerque,6"
discussed infra, the age discrimination provision in Section 4-33-7A
was attacked as being unconstitutionally vague by not providing
reasonable guidelines as to age. The New Mexico Supreme Court
considered the broad generic term "age" in the context of the included "bona fide occupational qualification" exception and found
that it did define with sufficient particularity the unlawful discriminatory practices intended to be prohibited by the legislature although
62. Id. § 4-33-2B (1953).
[*The courts have stated that the ADEA sets only minimum standards and does not
preempt stricter state statutes with broader coverage. See Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n
for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976).]
63. Id. § 4-33-7A (Supp. 1975).
64. Id. § 4-33-8E.
65. 85 N.M. 134, 509 P.2d 1329 (1973).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

the guidelines were admittedly not as "precise as the federal act
dealing with the same problems of age.... "66
The adequacy of the remedies provided for under the NMHRA
depends on the particular circumstances of the aggrieved individual.
For individuals between 40 and 65 years of age who may be subjected to discrimination based upon their age by persons employing
20 or more people, the ADEA offers a much broader scope of rights
and remedies. Also persons seeking relief against labor organizations
or employment agencies for age discrimination in membership,
training programs or job advertisement, as well as persons seeking
relief from discrimination in housing or credit, have no adequate
state remedy under the NMHRA and must proceed solely under the
ADEA 6 1 or other federal legislation. 6 8 Both the "Human Rights
Act" and the ADEA offer full injunctive relief to persons protected
by those respective acts. However, the NMHRA limits the award of
monetary damages to $1000,69 whereas recovery of actual and
punitive damages available under the ADEA are not subject to
statutory maximums.
B. ProceduralRequirements
Administration and enforcement of the NMHRA have been
delegated to the Human Rights Commission as created by the
statute. The Commission has the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to eliminate discrimination in employment. The Commission also has the authority to conduct hearings and fully
adjudicate any complaint alleging an unlawful discriminatory
practice. It is empowered to investigate, attempt reconciliation, hold
adjudicative hearings, issue cease and desist orders, award damages up
to $1,000 and apply to the district court for specific performance of
any conciliation agreement or for enforcement of any order it may
7
issue . 1
Timely and proper notice of alleged discriminatory practices must
be given under the state act. All complaints must be filed with the
Commission within ninety (90) days after the alleged act was
committed."' Failure to file within this ninety day period would
66. Id. at 139, 509 P.2d at 1334.
67. Where no state remedy exists or where no "adequate" state agency exists an
aggrieved individual need not defer to the state agency otherwise required by the ADEA, see
Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975).
68. Certain discriminatory practices based on age in the extending of credit are prohibited by the "Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976" Pub. L. No. 94-239,
amending, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 etseq. (Supp. V, 1975).
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-1OE (Supp. 1975).
70. Id. § 4-33-4A, B, C, D, and E (1953) and § 4-33-IOE (Supp. 1975).
71. Id. § 4-33-9A (1953).
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preclude the complainant from his state remedy and may also bar
later attempts to obtain federal relief under the ADEA as well
(discussed infra). The complaint must contain the name and address
of the person alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory
practice, the date of the alleged discrimination, a statement of facts,
and a statement of the relief requested. 2 The complaint is deemed
filed when it is received by the Commission 7 3 and must be served on
the respondent by the Commission within thirty days "by mail or in
person." 7
After filing of the complaint, the Commission staff conducts an
investigation into the alleged discriminatory practice. Upon completion of the investigation, the Commission issues a list of findings
76
of facts. 7" Either party may file exceptions to these findings,
after which the Commission makes a determination whether there
exists "probable cause" for the Commission to file its own complaint
concerning the alleged discriminatory practice. 7 7 If there is a finding
of "probable cause," the Commission must endeavor to attempt
conciliation between the parties. 7 s Failing to reach conciliation, the
Commission must then file its own complaint against the respondent 7 9 and an adjudicative hearing on the complaint must be held
within 15 days.8 0 When there is a finding of "no probable cause" by
the Commission or when the complaining party objects to the conciliation agreement reached between the Commission and respondent, the complainant must request a review hearing before the
Commission." At this hearing the complainant has the burden of
showing that the dismissal or the conciliation agreement was arbitrary, capricious or not in accordance with law. 8 2
The Commission's actions at the review hearing or at the
adjudicative hearing on the merits represents final administrative
action for purposes of appeal. Within 30 days after the review
hearing or entrance of the Commission's order in the adjuciative
72. "Rules and Regulations, New Mexico Human Rights Commission," Rule II(C)
(1974).
73. Id. Rule 11 (D) (2).
74. Id. Rule 11(E) (1).
75. Id. Rule III (A) (1).
76. Id. Rule III (A) (2).
77. Id. Rule IV(A).
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-9C (1953); "Rules and Regulations New Mexico Human
Rights Commission," Rule VII(A) (1974).
79. Id. § 4-33-9D; Rule IX(A)(1).
80. Id. Rule IX(A)(3).
81. Id. § 4-33-9B; Rule VI(A)(1) and VII(B)(1).
82. "Rules and Regulations, New Mexico Human Rights Commission," Rule VI(B)(2)
(1974).
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hearing, either party may file a notice of appeal with the district
court. The party aggrieved by an order of the Commission may
obtain a trial de novo in the district court8 3 where the scope of the
district court's review goes beyond the review ordinarily allowed of
administrative proceedings. The district court makes an independent
determination of facts from the record, transcript, 8 4 and such other
relevant evidence as the parties may choose to introduce. Either
party may request a trial by jury. 8 s This expanded scope of judicial
review by the district court was affirmed in Keller v. City of
Albuquerque, supra. In that case the Commission found in favor of a
city policeman who complained that he had been terminated from
employment solely on the basis of age. The district court on review
set aside the order of the Commission. The complainant appealed to
the New Mexico Supreme Court on the basis of traditional administrative law principles that limit the court's review to questions of
law, fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious actions, or whether the
Commission's order is supported by substantial evidence. The court
examined the standard of review of the NMHRA in comparison with
review standards of other state administrative agencies and found
that because the act provided for both a trial de novo and a trial by
jury the general rules of administrative review were not applicable.
The court concluded that the district court judge or jury ". . . has the
right to make an independent determination of the facts from the
record in the case and such additional relevant evidence as may be
presented ....-86
PRIOR RESORT TO STATE REMEDIES-A PROCEDURAL PITFALL
Section 633(b) of the ADEA provides that:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which
has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age
and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek
relief from such discriminating practice, no suit may be brought
under Section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days
after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated.... (emphasis
added). 8
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-12A (Supp. 1975).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-12B (Supp. 1975), "Rules and Regulations, New Mexico
Human Rights Commission," Rule XII (1974).
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-33-12C (Supp. 1975).
86. 85 N.M. 134, 138, 509 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1973).

87. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
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Several recent decisions have interpreted this section as creating yet
another condition precedent to jurisdiction in the federal courts;
namely, a prior resort to state remedies. While conceding that
Section 633(b) does not require a full exhaustion of state adminis89
the courts in Curry v. Continental Airlines,
trative remedies, 8
9
Goger v. H. K. Porter Company, Inc., 0 Vaughn v. Chrysler Corporation,9 1 and McGarvey v. Merck & Co., Inc.,"2 have held that Section
633(b) does require that the aggrieved individual must first seek
relief from the appropriate state agency before filing an ADEA claim
in federal court. The Secretary of Labor's interpretation that the
limitation contained in Section 633(b) applies only if the proceedings have already begun under state law and that the complainant has the option of pursuing either state or federal remedies
was rejected in Goger. The court instead adopted the following

interpretation:
We agree with the district court, however, that although the Act
does not require an aggrieved person to exhaust state remedies as a
condition precedent to the institution of a federal suit, it does
require that the State be given a threshold period of sixty days in
which it may attempt to resolve the controversy, normally by
voluntary compliance. 9 3
In concluding that Section 633(b) mandates a prior resort to state
administrative remedies in all instances where such remedies are
available, all of the above courts relied upon the similarity between
9 4
and
the provisions of Title VII of the "Civil Rights Act of 1964"
proanalogous
since
that
reasoning
Section 633(b) of the ADEA,
'9
have been construed to require a
visions of the "Civil Rights Act"
88. Exhaustion of the state remedy is clearly not at issue as 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970)
provides that "upon commencement of action under this chapter such action shall supercede any State action."
89. 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975). In Curry, the court found that there existed no
adequate state agency authorized to grant relief for the discriminated employee within the
meaning of 633(b) and therefore concluded that deferral in that case was not required.
90. 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
91. 382 F. Supp. 143 (E. D. Mich. 1974).
92. 359 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). Because of the newness of the ADEA and the fact that the
plaintiff in Goger had been misadvised by the Department of Labor, the circuit court
vacated the lower court's dismissal and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits
granting "equitable relief." McGarvey was thereafter vacated by the third circuit so that the
district court could reconsider their decision in light of the "equitable relief" afforded in
Goger.
93. 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
95. Id. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
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prior resort to state remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite, 9 6
construction compels the same result under the ADEA. 9 '

such

The crucial ramification of this judicial construction, currently
subscribed to by the 3rd and 9th Circuits and the Eastern District of
Michigan, is to impose a second statute of limitations on federal
court suits brought under the ADEA. The prospective ADEA litigant
must commence 9 8 his state proceeding within the applicable state
statute of limitations or be forever barred from having his ADEA
action heard in federal court. 9 9 The state statute of limitation is not
tolled by the federal action. The claimant cannot, once the time has
expired, cure the federal jurisdictional defect after his error is
discovered.
A more liberal construction of Section 633(b), however, was
reached in Skoglund v. Singer Company,' 0' where although 633(b)
was interpreted as requiring a "timely resort to state remedies"' 01
before a complaint could be filed in federal court, the provision itself
was not found to be a jurisdictional absolute which would preclude
the federal court from ever taking jurisdiction of a case regardless of
the circumstances or equitable considerations. In Skoglund, the
employee notified the state agency of the age discrimination one
month after the state statute of limitations had run. The employee's
failure to timely file with the state agency was allegedly due to
employer's failure to post the required notices of the ADEA and
employee's own lack of knowledge of the state and federal age
discrimination laws. The employer moved to dismiss the employee's
ADEA complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found the ADEA
to be "remedial legislation" which should not "be so narrowly read
as to preclude achievement of its purpose." ' 02 While noting that the
96. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S.
1004 (1971).
97. Though Section 633(b) of the ADEA and Section 2000e-5(c) of Title VII of the
"Civil Rights Act of 1964" are similar in language, the procedures of the ADEA are substantially dissimilar to those of Title VII. There is also no legislative history to support the
conclusion that Section 633(b) of the ADEA is a jurisdictional prerequisite as there is for
Section 2000e-5(c). See the concurring opinion of Judge Garth in Goger.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970) provides that both the 60 day period and the state
proceeding are "deemed to have been commenced" upon the filing of a written and signed
statement of facts sent by registered mail to the state authority regardless of more stringent
state law requirements.
99. The "equitable relief" afforded the litigants in Goger and McGarvey because of the
newness of the statute and the reliance on erroneous official advice may no longer apply.
See Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 91, at 146.
100. 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. (1975); see also Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256
(10th Cir. 1976).
101. 403 F. Supp. at 802.
102. Id. at 801.
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congressional purpose of Section 633(b) was to further federal and
state relations and to encourage deferral to states and their remedial
efforts, the court reasoned that to construe the section as a jurisdictional prerequisite would not serve to further this purpose but
'
only to "deny plaintiff any remedy at all." 0 3 The court concluded
that:
I do not believe that plaintiff's failure to comply with Section
633(b) deprives this court of the power to hear this case. There is no
of ADEA that the
indication in either the history or the wording
0 4
Section 633(b) requirement is jurisdictional.'
The construction eventually afforded Section 633(b) in other
circuits is difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the newness of the
ADEA and the judicial inhospitality which has greeted it make it
advisable for prospective New Mexico litigants and their attorneys to
be mindful of the 90 day New Mexco statute of limitation by timely
initiating their claim before the New Mexico Human Rights Commission and thus avoiding any unnecessary risk of having their ADEA
action later barred in federal court by a strict reading of Section
633(b). The lesson to be learned from the judicial interpretations
given the ADEA procedural requirements is that once the age
discrimination has been discovered and before 90 days have elapsed,
two signed and written statements setting forth the complaint should
be sent by registered mail. The first should be addressed to the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission and the second to the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division.'s The letter to the
Department of Labor should also contain a clear statement of the
individual's intent to file his own suit. Upon expiration of 60 days
the aggrieved individual may then file his own ADEA action in
federal court.
CONCLUSION
The "Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967" and the
"New Mexico Human Rights Act" supply a comprehensive statutory
103. Id. at 802.
104. Id. The court in Skoglund adopted the reasoning of Reeb v. Economic Opportunity
Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975) and Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1974) which found the Title VII filing
requirements not to be jurisdictional in the strict sense but analagous to a statute of
limitations and thus subject to equitable modifications such as tolling and estoppel. This
reasoning was again adopted in Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
105. In Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 91, at 145, the court was of the opinion
that the notice to the Secretary of Labor could not be sent until after the expiration of the
60 day state deferment period. There is no statutory basis for this interpretation in the
ADEA.
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framework of protection for the elderly employee in New Mexico.
The effectiveness of these laws in shielding the senior worker from
age discrimination in employment ultimately rests with the courts.
Thus far, as evidenced by the cases discussed in this article, the
federal courts have generally displayed an attitude of ambivalence
toward the ADEA by judicially erecting one procedural hurdle after
another before prospective claimants. This article has attempted to
clarify these state and federal acts as they have been judicially
construed and to hopefully provide a guide for the private litigant
through the procedural pitfalls as they presently exist. Age discrimination is both subtle and pervasive in the "youth culture"
society we live in. These laws are relatively new with limited or no
judicial interpretation. As society and jurists become more cognizant
of age discrimination and its devastating effect on our elderly, the
laws may take on more meaning in a practical sense and succeed in
affording the effective protection originally envisioned by Congress
and the New Mexico Legislature.

